

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4260
SECDEF WASHDC
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DIR TRI-TAC FT MONMOUTH NJ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NATO 05475

SECDEF FOR ASD(ISA), ASD(C3I), DDR&E; DA FOR MGEN RIENZI

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO, ETEL, MARR
SUBJECT: INTEROPERABILITY OF TACTICAL AREA COMMUNICATIONS

REF: (A) STATE 122939 DTG 271422Z MAY 77; (B) STATE
127834 DTG 022311Z JUN 77; (C) TAB E, NATO ACTION PLAN;
(D) USNATO 5103 DTG 102025Z JUN 77; (E) STATE 136971
DTG 140129Z JUN 77; (F) USNATO 4155 DTG 261803Z MAY 77;
(G) USNATO 4954 DTG 081819Z JUN 77; (H) USNATO 5444 DTG
161139Z JUN 77

SUMMARY: AS REQUESTED, WE PROVIDE OUR COMMENTS ON PREVIOUS
WASHINGTON GUIDANCE (REF A) CONCERNING SECDEF BROWN'S
INTERVENTION AT MAY 1977 DPC MINISTERIAL, SUBJECT ABOVE.
WE AGREE WITH THE GUIDANCE FOR THE LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES.
TO OBTAIN NEAR-TERM INTEROPERABILITY, WE BELIEVE THE FOUR
POWERS MUST FIRST REACH AGREEMENT SINCE IT IS THEY WHO
HAVE THE LARGEST EQUIPMENT INVESTMENTS AT THIS TIME. WE
BELIEVE THE TECHNICAL ISSUES ARE: (1) AGREEMENT TO ADOPT
EUROCOM STANDARDS, AND (2) SELECTION OF THE TYPE OF COMSEC
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ARCHITECTURE. WE FAVOR AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD MODIFY ALL
EQUIPMENT CURRENTLY IN DEVELOPMENT, OR ABOUT TO BE PRO-
DUCED, TO MEET COMMON INTERFACE SPECIFICATIONS, WITH SOME
FORM OF COMMON FUNDING FOR THE MODIFICATIONS TO CURRENT
SYSTEMS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE TRI-SERVICE GROUP (TSG) CAN
OBTAIN A NATO AGREEMENT WITHIN SIX MONTHS IF INFORMAL
AGREEMENT HAS FIRST BEEN REACHED BY THE FOUR-POWER NATIONS.

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE CURRENT INFRASTRUCTURE MACHINERY IS APPROPRIATE. WE SUPPORT AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR NICSMA, BUT BELIEVE THAT ROLE SHOULD BE LIMITED TO MAINTENANCE OF INTERFACE SPECIFICATIONS AFTER AGREEMENT IS REACHED. WE PREFER TO SEE THE INTEROPERABILITY SPECIFICATIONS DEVELOPED BY NATIONAL REPS TO AN AD HOC GROUP UNDER THE TSGCEE, RESIDENT IN BRUSSELS. ACTION REQUESTED: RECOMMEND WASHINGTON NOT PURSUE THE INITIATIVE AT THE JUNE TSG MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. AT WASHINGTON REQUEST, WE HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE APPROACH DESCRIBED IN REF A (AND REINFORCED IN REFS B AND E) TO IMPLEMENT THE SECDEF INITIATIVE ON SUBJECT ABOVE. OUR COMMENTS FOLLOW.

2. WE AGREE THAT THE TWO APPROPRIATE BODIES MOST ABLE TO PLAN AND PROVIDE DETAILED POLICY GUIDANCE FOR THE TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION OF TACTICAL AND LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS ARE THE TRI-SERVICE GROUP ON COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT (TSGCEE) AND THE NATO JOINT COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS COMMITTEE (NJCEC), RESPECTIVELY. THEIR EFFORTS, HOWEVER, MUST NOT ONLY BE GEARED TO WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED TECHNOLOGICALLY, BUT ALSO MUST BE DIRECTED AND CONSTRAINED BY WELL-DEFINED, TIME-PHASED MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS OBJECTIVES. THESE OBJECTIVES CAN ONLY BE PLANNED AND VALIDATED BY THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS (MNC'S), WHO IN TURN HARMONIZE THE COMMUNICATIONS NEEDS OF THEIR SUBORDINATE FORCES, INCLUDING NATIONAL TACTICAL FORCES. CONSEQUENTLY, IN OUR VIEW, EFFORTS BY THE TSGCEE
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AND NJCEC SHOULD BE IN RESPONSE TO TOTAL NATO MILITARY NEEDS. STATEMENTS OF THESE MILITARY NEEDS, IN THE LONG-TERM PROGRAM, CAN CERTAINLY BE PROVIDED BY SACEUR AS SUGGESTED IN DPC/D(77)16 (REF D). WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, WHETHER SUCH REQUIREMENTS CAN BE FORMULATED IN TIME FOR THE NEAR-TERM PROGRAM, WHICH IN TURN WILL INFLUENCE THE LONG-TERM PROGRAM AS STATED IN REF B. WE ARE LEFT, THEN, WITH THE SITUATION WHERE THE LONG-TERM C3 PROGRAM WILL BE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY A NEAR-TERM TACTICAL AREA COMMUNICATIONS PROGRAM WHICH MUST NECESSARILY COMMENCE, AT LEAST, DRIVEN BY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS.

3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE WILL SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING SECDEF'S GOAL IF WE PROCEED INITIALLY IN THE TSGCEE FORUM. THE TSGCEE IS TOO LARGE A GROUP, IS NEWLY-CONSTITUTED, AND HAS NO CHAIRMAN. THE AGENDA FOR ITS FIRST MEETING IS ALREADY OVERLY-AMBITIOUS. THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION FOR MANY NATIONS IS TOO LOW FOR THE POLITICAL TASK OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT THAT MAY HAVE PROFOUND NATIONAL ECONOMIC IM-

PACT. (WE PROVIDE A LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES KNOWN TO US IN PARA 10 BELOW.) WE BELIEVE THAT WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME THE RECEPTIVENESS OF OUR ALLIES TO THE SECDEF INTERVENTION WILL COOL; HENCE, WE MUST OBTAIN A CONSENSUS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD TAKE THE TSGCEE MORE THAN A YEAR TO REACH AN AGREED NATO POSITION.

4. INSTEAD, WE STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT THE INITIATIVE FIRST BE EXPLORED BY ASD(C3I) DINNEEN AND HIS COUNTERPARTS FROM THE UK, FRG, AND FRANCE. WHILE WE RECOGNIZE FULLY THE

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SENSITIVITY OF THE NATIONS TO COALITIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WE WILL MAKE NO PROGRESS WITHIN NATO UNLESS THESE FOUR NATIONS, WHICH HAVE THE LARGEST EQUIPMENT INVESTMENT AT THIS TIME, CAN AGREE TO THE SECDEF'S GOAL. THE CRUCIAL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES WHICH MUST BE RESOLVED TO ACCELERATE INTEROPERABILITY ALL FOCUS ON THE IMPACT AN AGREEMENT WILL HAVE ON THE RITA, AUTOKONETZ, PTARMIGAN, AND TRI-TAC SYSTEMS. (AS AN ALTERNATIVE, SUCH A MEETING MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE BELGIUM, WHICH IS BUYING PART OF RITA, AND THE NETHERLANDS AND ITALY WHICH ARE ALSO DEVELOPING SYSTEMS.) THESE SEVEN NATIONS WERE REFERRED TO BY ASYG (DEFENSE SUPPORT) LABERGE AS THE "PRODUCING NATIONS."

5. WE BELIEVE THAT ONCE A CONSENSUS IS REACHED BY THE FOUR POWERS (OR POSSIBLY BY THE SEVEN "PRODUCING" NATIONS), THE

TSGCEE COULD THEN TAKE OVER TO OBTAIN NATO CONSENSUS ON PLANNING DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION, AND ON DIRECTING SUBSEQUENT WORK. WE BELIEVE NATO AGREEMENT UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE SECURED WITHIN SIX MONTHS IF THE FOUR POWERS HAVE REACHED PRIOR AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE GOAL.

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6. WHILE WE ARE NOT SURE OF THE KIND AND DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION MOST APPROPRIATE FOR NICSMA, WE DO BELIEVE THAT THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO AUGMENT NICSMA STAFFING AND TO ACQUIRE THE NECESSARY BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE WOULD WORK AGAINST EARLY ATTAINMENT OF AGREED INTEROPERABILITY SPECIFICATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE WOULD RECOMMEND FORMATION, IN BRUSSELS, OF A WORKING GROUP UNDER THE TSGCEE, COMPOSED OF EXPERTS FROM THE FOUR (OR SEVEN) PRODUCING NATIONS, TO WORK FULL-TIME FOR SIX MONTHS TO PRODUCE THE NECESSARY INTEROPERABILITY SPECIFICATIONS. NICSMA COULD AND SHOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE AS A MEMBER TO INSURE NICS TACTICAL INTEROPERABILITY. WE BELIEVE THAT AGREED INTEROPERABILITY SPECIFICATIONS COULD BE DRAFTED AND AGREED WITHIN ONE YEAR.

7. ALTHOUGH WE AGREE THAT SOME SORT OF COMMON FUNDING MAY BE REQUIRED TO EXECUTE EARLY INTEROPERABILITY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT APPROPRIATE TO USE NATO'S INFRASTRUCTURE MACHINERY. ONLY FOUR, OR POSSIBLY SEVEN, OF THE NATIONS WOULD BE AFFECTED FINANCIALLY BY AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING R&D OR PRODUCTION COSTS. A COMMON FUNDED PROGRAM TO PAY FOR SUCH COSTS IN MODIFICATION OF EXISTING SYSTEMS MAY WELL BE NECESSARY. RULES OF ELIGIBILITY FOR COMMON FUNDING, THE NATIONS WHO WILL CONTRIBUTE TO COMMON FUNDING, AND THE DETERMINATION OF NATIONAL SHARES WILL BE MAJOR QUESTIONS TO BE RESOLVED. FINANCIAL REMUNERATION FOR MODIFICATIONS COULD BE ESTABLISHED VIA A FORMULA IN WHICH THE NATION OR NATIONS LEAST AFFECTED BY THE AGREED INTERFACE SPECS WOULD SUBSIDIZE THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO SYSTEMS OF NATIONS THAT ARE AFFECTED THE MOST. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE INTERFACE SPECS MOST CLOSELY AGREED WITH THE RITA SYSTEM, THEN FRANCE WOULD HELP SUBSIDIZE THE MODIFICATIONS TO US, UK, AND GERMAN EQUIPMENT. SUCH A FORMULA WOULD TEMPER THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY NATIONAL REPS WHEN DEVELOPING THE INTEROPERABILITY SPECIFICATIONS, AND WOULD PERMIT DECISIONS BASED ON LOGIC RATHER THAN ON RELATIVE NATIONAL COSTS.

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8. WE BELIEVE THAT DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE HIGH LEVEL COMMU-

NICATIONS MANAGERS OF THE FOUR NATIONS SHOULD ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING TOPICS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY:

A. AGREE THAT ACCELERATED INTEROPERABILITY IS A CRITICAL GOAL AND THAT EACH NATION WILL REDIRECT ITS PROGRAMS TO ACHIEVE IT. ALTHOUGH REACTION AT THE MAY DPC MINISTERIAL SEEMED FAVORABLE TO THE SECDEF INTERVENTION, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT OUR ALLIES DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE US PROPOSAL (SEE REFS F, G, AND H). CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER OR NOT THE FOUR POWERS AGREE ON THE NEED TO ACCELERATE INTEROPERABILITY AND ARE WILLING TO REORIENT THEIR CURRENT PROGRAMS TO ACHIEVE IT.

B. AGREE THAT EUROCOM STANDARDS (VICE FINABEL OR US STANDARDS) WILL BE THE BASIS FOR INTEROPERABILITY SPECIFICATIONS, DESPITE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS WITH THE EUROCOM STANDARDS. BESIDES NOT BEING COMPLETE, THEY FALL FAR SHORT OF THE TECHNICAL SPECS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO INSURE COMPLETE INTEROPERABILITY OF TACTICAL AND LONG-HAUL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. FRANCE, GERMANY, UK AND US ARE DEVELOPING OR FIELDING ENTIRE TACTICAL AREA COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, WHILE THE NETHERLANDS AND ITALY ARE DEVELOPING OR FIELDING PORTIONS OF SUCH SYSTEMS. OF THESE, ONLY TWO NATIONS (THE UK AND THE US) HAVE TACTICAL AREA COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS WHICH SATISFY MOST OF THE EUROCOM STANDARDS. AUTOKONETZ DOES NOT MEET EUROCOM DIGITAL STANDARDS, AND THE RITA SYSTEM SATISFIES ONLY FINABEL STANDARDS. RITA WOULD BE

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AFFECTED THE MOST SEVERELY IN COMPLYING TO EUROCOM STANDARDS, YET OF ALL THE MAJOR SYSTEMS IT IS THE CLOSEST TO COMPLETION.

C. SETTLE THE BASIC ISSUE OF THE COMSEC ARCHITECTURE TO BE SELECTED, END-TO-END ENCRYPTION OR LINK-BY-LINK ENCRYPTION. OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE IS THIS PRINCIPAL AREA OF COMSEC IN WHICH US SPECS DIFFER FROM EUROCOM STANDARDS. US SPECS (THOSE FOR BOTH TRI-TAC AND THE DCS PHASE II SECURE VOICE PROGRAM) DEFINE AN END-TO-END ENCRYPTION ARCHITECTURE, WHEREAS THE EUROCOM STANDARDS REQUIRE ONLY LINK-BY-LINK ENCRYPTION AND CONSIDER END-TO-END ENCRYPTION TO BE A FUTURE OBJECTIVE TO BE IMPLEMENTED WHERE COST EFFECTIVE. ALTHOUGH THE US OFFERED NATO ITS COMSEC SYSTEM (VINSON-TENLEY) OVER ONE YEAR AGO, NATO HAS NOT YET ACCEPTED THE OFFER, POSSIBLY BECAUSE SOME NATIONS ARE CONCERNED THAT THE COMSEC ARCHITECTURE IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TRI-TAC SYSTEM.

D. AGREE ON THE NEED TO SUBSIDIZE, VIA SOME SORT OF COMMON FUNDING, THE MODIFICATIONS OR CHANGES TO CURRENT PROGRAMS
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IN ORDER TO MOTIVATE REDIRECTION OF CURRENT PROGRAMS.

E. AGREE TO MODIFY ALL SYSTEMS TO MEET A SET OF COMMON INTEROPERABILITY SPECIFICATIONS, OR TO SELECT ONE OF THE FOUR PRINCIPAL SYSTEMS (POSSIBLY WITH MODIFICATION): RITA, AUTOKONETZ, PTARMIGAN, OR TRI-TAC.

F. AGREE TO USE A NATO ORGANIZATION SUCH AS NICSMA (OR POSSIBLY NAMSA) TO DEVELOP, OR AT LEAST MAINTAIN, CONFIGURATION CONTROL OF THE AGREED SPECIFICATIONS.

G. AGREE ON THE POTENTIAL NEED TO SUBSIDIZE POORER NATIONS VIA SOME SORT OF COMMON FUNDING TO ACCELERATE THE EARLY ACQUISITION AND FIELDING OF INTEROPERABLE TACTICAL AREA COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

9. AMONG OTHER OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO ACHIEVE INTEROPERABILITY MORE QUICKLY, TWO POSSIBILITIES ARE:

A. DISCONTINUE ALL NATIONAL PROGRAMS, HAVE NICSMA CREATE A SET OF COMMON SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON EUROCOM STANDARDS, AND DEVELOP OR PROCURE THE EQUIPMENT VIA NATO COMMON FUNDED PROCEDURES. WE BELIEVE THIS OPTION TO BE THE LEAST REALISTIC TO ACHIEVE SHORT-TERM RESULTS. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE TASK IS ENORMOUS, EVEN IN A SINGLE NATION ENVIRONMENT. A SENSE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE WORK REQUIRED CAN BE OBTAINED

BY REVIEWING THE IMMENSE AMOUNT OF NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION IN THE TRI-TAC PROGRAM, INCLUDING SYSTEM, SUBSYSTEM, AND EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS, INTERFACE SPECIFICATIONS, INTERFACE CONTROL DRAWINGS, TEST PLANS AND TEST SPECIFICATIONS. BASED ON NICSMA'S PROGRESS TO DATE IN IMPLEMENTING THE NICS, IF THE CURRENT NICSMA ORGANIZATION WERE EXPANDED TO PERFORM THE TASK, WE BELIEVE AT LEAST FIVE YEARS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PRODUCE SUCH NEW SPECIFICATIONS.

B. DISCONTINUE NATIONAL PROGRAMS; SELECT ONE SET OF EXIST-
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ING SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS FOR USE BY ALL THE NATIONS; AND USE NICSMA TO MANAGE THE ACQUISITION OF EQUIPMENT UNDER INFRASTRUCTURE-LIKE COMMON FUNDED PROCEDURES. THE KEY ISSUES OF THIS OPTION ARE, WHICH SYSTEM TO SELECT AND WHO SHOULD PAY. OF THE MAJOR SYSTEMS, THE ONE CLOSEST TO COMPLETION IS THE FRENCH (AND BELGIAN) SYSTEM, RITA; YET, RITA DOES NOT MEET EUROCOM SPECIFICATIONS. SIMILARLY, THE GERMAN AUTOKONETZ SYSTEM, PARTIALLY IN PRODUCTION, DOES NOT MEET EUROCOM DIGITAL STANDARDS. NEXT IN TERMS OF AVAILABILITY COMES THE UK SYSTEM, PTARMIGAN, WHICH MEETS ALL EUROCOM STANDARDS, AND, FINALLY, THE US TRI-TAC SYSTEM WHICH MEETS MOST EUROCOM STANDARDS AND EXCEEDS MANY OTHERS, MOST NOTABLY COMSEC. IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY OF THESE SYSTEMS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED FAIRLY READILY IF ALL NATIONS COULD AGREE ON WHICH SYSTEM TO SELECT. ALTHOUGH NO AGREEMENT TO SELECT A SINGLE SYSTEM WAS REACHED BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE, WE BELIEVE AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE ACHIEVED USING THE STRATEGY SUGGESTED IN PARAS 4 AND 5, ABOVE. (SEE ALSO REF H.)

10. THE LEVEL OF NATIONAL REPS TO THE TSGCEE IS CLEAR FROM THE LIST OF NAMES PROVIDED TO THE CHAIRMAN OF AC/297-WG/1 AT THE 8-10 JUNE 77 MEETINGS:

-- BE: LTC GREINDL, DIRECTORATE TRI-SERVICE COMMUNICATIONS

-- CA: COL GEORGE GAUTHIER, DGCEO

-- GE: HERR JAMSEN, ACTING SUB-ARMAMENTS DIRECTOR (TRI-

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SERVICE)

-- IT: NOT NAMED, BUT A BRIGADIER

-- NE: COL DE BIE, DEFENSE MATERIAL COMMAND

-- NO: BRIGADIER GORRA, TITLE UNKNOWN

-- UK: BRIGADIER ACASS, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT EXECUTIVE

-- US: MR. SALTON, OASD(C3I) AND MR. GREINKE (ODDR&E)

11. WE FAVOR THE APPROACH SUGGESTED IN PARAS 4 THROUGH 8 AS THE PREFERRED APPROACH TO ACHIEVE THE SECDEF'S OBJECTIVE MOST RAPIDLY. WE BELIEVE THAT FULLY-AGREED SPECS COULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN 18 MONTHS AFTER REACHING INFORMAL AGREEMENT AMONG THE FOUR-POWER NATIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THE APPROACH SUGGESTED IN PREVIOUS GUIDANCE IS RISKIER AND WOULD TAKE LONGER.

12. ACTION REQUESTED: REQUEST WASHINGTON RECONSIDER
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DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT AT THE JUNE TSGCEE MEETING AND CONCENTRATE INSTEAD ON A FOUR-POWER MEETING OF COMMUNICATIONS MANAGERS IN EARLY JULY, 1977. STREATOR

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